Governance in Water Supply by Straub, Stéphane
  09-029 
Research Group: Development March, 2009 
Governance in Water Supply 
STÉPHANE STRAUB 
 
  
 
 
Governance in Water Supply 
 
Thematic paper for the Global Development Network project  
“Varieties of Governance: Effective Public Service Delivery“1 
 
 
 
Stéphane Straub 
Toulouse School of Economics, Arqade and IDEI 
 
March 2009 
                                                           
1 I would like to thank Guillermo Perry, as well as Phil Keefer, Ernesto Stein and participants at the 
workshop “Varieties of Governance: Effective Public Service Delivery“ in Kuwait City, for detailed 
and very useful comments on a previous version of this paper. 
 2 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
1. Diagnostic of the Water Situation 
 
Approximately 97.5% of the world’s water is salty. Of the remaining fresh 
water (2.5%, representing 35 million cubic kilometers/year (cukm/year)), only 90,000 
cukm/year (0.26% of the fresh water resources) is accessible. Of this, close to two-
thirds is green water, which evaporates into the atmosphere. That leaves about 
40,000 cukm/year, of which 12,500 can be accessed under prevailing technical and 
economic conditions (Saleth and Dinar, 2002). 
 
Current withdrawals are close to a one third of this accessible water, and demand is 
growing faster than supply in many places. The main sources of withdrawals and 
consumption, shown in Figure 1, are agricultural uses (irrigation), industrial use, and 
finally domestic consumption. Although small (around 10%), the share of domestic 
consumption is expected to rise due to population growth (the world’s population is 
expected to reach 12 billion by 2010), and rural-urban migration (the share of urban 
population, equal to 43% around 2000, is expected to reach 61% by 2025). Total 
withdrawals could reach 70% of the accessible water by 2025 (Postel, Daily and 
Ehrlich, 1996), in a scenario where the practical limit to ensure renewability varies 
between 30 and 60%. Some countries, for example in the Middle East, are already 
near or above their own renewable water supply limit. Note that there are 
tremendous inequalities across countries in term of access to water resources. For 
example, Brazil has about one-fifth of the world’s fresh water resources for a 
population of 190 million, while India and China have only one-tenth of global fresh 
water resources for a joint population of close to 2.5 billion (Saleth and Dinar, 2002). 
 
 3 
 
 
Figure 1 : Water Withdrawals by Sectors 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1900 1950 1980 1990 2000 2025 2050
Evaporation from
reservoirs
Withdrawal for industry
Withdrawal for domestic
use
Withdrawal for agriculture
 
Source: World Water Council, 2002. 
 
Moreover, many countries in the developing world are currently unable to respond 
to the basic water and sanitation needs of their population, as shown by the World 
Bank development indicators and WHO-UNICEF statistics summarized in Tables 1 
and 2 below. 
 
Table 1: Improved water source and sanitation facilities as of 2006  
(% of population with access, by geographical regions) 
Regions Improved water source Improved sanitation 
facilities 
 Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban 
East Asia & Pacific 87,4 80,9 96,3 65,5 58,7 75,1 
Europe & Central Asia 95,0 88,0 99,0 88,8 78,9 94,3 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 91,4 73,1 96,9 78,3 51,1 86,2 
Middle East & North 
Africa 89,0 81,4 94,8 74,6 58,7 88,9 
South Asia 86,9 83,9 94,0 32,8 23,0 56,7 
Sub-Saharan Africa 58,4 45,6 81,3 30,7 24,3 42,3 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
In the classification of the WHO, improved water sources are sources “that, by nature 
of their construction or through active intervention, are protected from outside 
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contamination, particularly faecal matter. These include piped water in a dwelling, 
plot or yard, and other improved sources”. Similarly, an improved sanitation facility 
is one “that ensures hygienic separation of human excreta from human contact” 
(WHO-UNICEF, 2008). 
 
Table 2: Improved water source and sanitation facilities as of 2006  
(% of population with access, by level of development) 
Regions Improved water source Improved sanitation 
facilities 
 Total Rural Urban Total Rural Urban 
High income 99,6 98,1 99,8 99,9 99,3 99,9 
Middle income 89,2 82,5 96,6 59,2 44,2 76,3 
Upper middle income 94,6 83,2 98,4 82,7 63,6 89,1 
Lower middle income 88,0 82,5 95,8 54,0 42,4 70,9 
Low income 67,7 60,2 83,7 39,5 33,1 54,0 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
 
According to the latest WHO-Unicef figures, as of 2006, 2.5 billion people are without 
access to improved sanitation (corresponding to a global access rate of 62%), and one 
billion people in rural areas still practice open defecation. Although a number of 
developing countries are on track to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 
of a 77% rate of coverage, large parts of sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia are 
not, meaning that the world as a whole is not on track to meet the MDG sanitation 
target. 
 
In terms of drinking water, 87% of the world’s population uses drinking water from 
improved sources as of 2006 ( 54% a piped connection in their dwelling, plot or yard, 
and 33% other improved drinking water sources). This translates into 5.7 billion 
people worldwide who are now using drinking water from an improved source, an 
increase of 1.6 billion since 1990. Trends indicate that most countries are on track to 
meet the MDG drinking water target (89%), except again in sub-Saharan Africa, 
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where coverage is still considerably lower than in other regions (although it has 
increased from 49% in 1990 to 58% in 2006). 
 
Scarcity is also a threat on irrigation in agriculture, putting further stress on 
subsistence of the poorest population in particular in Africa and Asia: 40% of all food 
production depends on (irrigation) water, with peaks at 70% in China and 50% in 
India, and so does 20% of global fish yields and 20% of global power supply (Saleth 
and Dinar, 2002).  
 
2. The Nature of the Good. 
 
While (urban) water does not fully qualify as a public good (it is rival and also 
largely excludable), it still has some public good characteristics that may justify 
public intervention in its supply. Drinking water is essential for life: the minimum 
required is between 2 and 4 liters per day of drinking water depending on how hot 
the climate is, and 20 to 50 liters per day for hygiene and domestic purpose. 
However, these are lower bounds, and even in very poor areas some usage is not 
purely for subsistence, implying a price elasticity of demand that, although small, 
varies for developing countries between -.25 and -.75 (Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 
2002). Therefore, the fact that water is essential for life does not make it 
fundamentally different from any other good. Simply, its value is related to its 
scarcity as for any standard good.2 
 
Water also has large externalities. The first category of externalities is related to the 
cost imposed on other economic agents (alternative present or future usage) by 
extraction at a non-renewable rate. The second category comes from usage 
byproducts in terms of spillage and pollution of water supply sources. Indeed, both 
                                                           
2
 This is true even in extreme situations, as illustrated vividly in Fischer (2002) in the case of the 
Middle East water management project. 
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improved drinking water quality and waste water treatment facilities have the 
potential to deliver significant health improvements through the reduction of the 
transmission of communicable water-related diseases.3 As a matter of fact, over 12 
million people, among which a majority of children, still die yearly because of water-
borne diseases such as diarrhea or cholera. These aspects have partly fueled the 
controversy about whether water should be treated as a private good (independently 
of the fact that it is privately or publicly provided).  
Moreover, the water sector is characterized by a number of other important facts.4 
First of all, the availability and cost of good water resources is highly variable 
between different places. Second, the water sector is in general not competitive. This 
is due in particular to the fact that the sector has very large sunk cost, with fixed 
assets having few alternative uses and very long life duration, and large economies 
of density and scale. As a consequence, the ratio of fixed to variable costs is high, 
making full recovery water tariffs difficult to sustain. This in turn makes problems of 
opportunism and expropriation of different types of rent relatively acute. It is also a 
sector in which innovation, be it technological progress or changes in organizational 
forms, has been limited. The resulting low return, high risk profile of the sector has 
meant lower average returns, making it more difficult to attract capital than in other 
infrastructure sectors.5 
Finally, because of the massive and partly essential nature of consumption, of the 
potential of the sector for manipulation through the attribution of favors to particular 
individuals or groups, of the intrinsically  important information problems related to 
quality, externalities, usage and spillage monitoring, etc., the water sector is almost 
by essence a very politicized one. Political economy issues therefore weigh strongly 
                                                           
3 See for example Esrey (1996) and Galiani, Gertler and Schardgrovsky (2005). 
4 See a more detailed discussion of these aspects in Savedoff and Spiller (1999), Noll et al. (2002), and 
Shirley (2007), inter alia. 
5  See for example evidence of this for Latin America in Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch and Foster (2005). 
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on policy making and on the regulatory process and are an essential ingredient of 
any reform process. 
 
II. The Water Sector: A Sector of Many Mismatches 
 
By its very nature, the water sector involves, more than any other infrastructure 
sector, the management of disjoint, yet overlapping geographical and institutional 
dimensions. Indeed, whatever the choices made in terms of physical supply options, 
in terms of the degree of decentralization of the many water supply functions 
(building, operating, regulating), and in terms of the economic organization of the 
sector (public versus different degrees of private involvement), significant tensions 
resulting from mismatches of functions, jurisdiction and objectives will occur.  
This implies that on top of the efficiency of specific institutional “links” in the water 
“chain”, the overall organization of- and boundaries between these links will matter 
importantly for the overall efficiency of the water sector. Put differently, it means 
that policy analysis should be concerned both with prescriptions aimed at 
maximizing the efficiency of specific institutions (e.g. operators’ efficiency, 
regulators’ competence and endowments), but should also, more than in any other 
sector, consider how the failures associated with externalities and existing 
geographical and institutional mismatches (these last ones often related to political 
constraints difficult to move in the short term) will affect the impact of the choices 
made at the level of individual institutional links.  
It also implies that the appropriate institutional arrangements and the reforms of the 
existing ones will differ greatly across countries, making the water sector almost a 
paradigm of a case in which cross-country comparability and institutional transplant 
are difficult, not to say that they are bound to fail. This, together with the sector 
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complexity described above and the politically sensitive nature of the good, explains 
why reforms are so difficult to engineer and sustain in this sector. 
Among the mismatches at the heart of the water sector, the following emerge as most 
significant. 
 
1. The tension between the characteristics of water resources in terms of ease of 
access (quality and distance to the resources) and the strength of related 
externalities on the one hand, and the local nature of the entities responsible 
for building, and operating water supply systems. The magnitude of the 
tensions will obviously depend on the degree of decentralization of public 
services (who is responsible, and with which degrees of autonomy, for the 
functions mentioned above), and also on the intrinsic cost of water supply that 
derives from the physical characteristics of the resource. This issue may be 
particularly acute for large developing countries’ cities, which are generally in 
charge of their water supply systems but may depend on very different types 
of water resources in terms of cost and sustainability.  
 
Lima in Peru and Mexico City in Mexico provide examples of cities in which 
this issue is particularly relevant ( Noll, Shirley and Cowan, 2002). Both rely 
on distant or costly and potentially unsustainable water resources. In the case 
of Lima, water is extracted from a polluted river and from an aquifer, in both 
cases at unsustainable rates, causing pollution of the aquifer through sea salt 
water. In Mexico City, two-thirds is extracted from the city deep aquifer at 
unsustainable rates, while the rest is pumped from distant rivers (in some 
cases over 100 km away and below the city level). 
 
Interestingly, there are examples of countries moving in different directions. 
While a number of European countries for example are moving towards 
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greater concentration of provision (e.g. The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy), 
others like Brazil are going towards a more decentralized structure (Barraqué, 
Formiga Johnsson and Nogueira, 2008). In this evolution, it is likely that path 
dependency linked to political history plays an important role. Foster (2005) 
emphasizes for example that in many developing countries, decentralization 
of the industrial organization of the water sector has often been the byproduct 
of a broader decentralization trend rather than a policy designed specifically 
for this sector. 
 
2. These tensions are exacerbated in a context where integrated management of 
the different dimensions of water is increasingly sought: demand and supply; 
economic, public health and environment, etc. (see for example Gleick, 2000, 
and Barraqué et al., 2008). This is for example particularly relevant in the areas 
of policy making and regulation in the water sector. Indeed, both activities 
have to deal with the overlaps between the economic dimension (key public 
service, component of urban infrastructure), the health dimension (potable 
water and adequate sanitation) and the environmental dimension (resource 
exhaustion, pollution). As a result, it is often the case that several ministries 
are involved in policy making, and several regulatory bodies potentially 
involved in overlapping tasks (Foster, 2005). Across Latin America for 
example, economic issues are often bundled with either health or 
environmental issues as responsibility of the corresponding ministries 
(Panama, Venezuela). Similarly, economic regulators often assume health-
related task such as monitoring of drinking water quality or environmental 
ones such as the monitoring of effluent discharge from sewers, but are rarely 
involved in the granting of extraction licenses. The consequences of 
potentially non-coordinated decisions between the different bodies in charge 
may imply barriers to entry or cost overruns with important implications on 
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the industrial organization of the sector and the suitability of regulatory 
decisions on tariffs for example (Foster, 2005). 
 
3. Finally, a further mismatch relates to the fact that the political and 
geographical jurisdictions of regulators often do not overlap with that of 
service providers. For example, the increasing decentralization of services to 
regional or municipal providers coexists in many countries with a centralized 
regulatory structure, creating political tensions and added complexity to the 
regulatory process in a context where regulators may already lack material 
resources and competence. The fact that this evolution has in many cases been 
one from unregulated centralized (public) provision to regulated 
decentralized (public or private) provision adds to the difficulties in assessing 
the merit of different reforms path.  
 
Moreover, this problem is often related to a more classical type of mismatch in 
sectors in which important reforms are intended, namely the lack of 
coordination of the relative timings of structural and regulatory reforms. 
Indeed, structural industrial reforms most of the time preceded regulatory 
reforms, and these in turn had to deal with new settings that were not 
designed with the regulatory issues in mind.  
 
The evolution of the Honduran Water sector, described in Walker, Velásquez, 
Ordóñez and Rodríguez (1999), exemplifies these points. Although a law from 
the early 1960s pushed for operating centralization, this was never achieved, 
and in practice tens of municipal water systems are in operation ever since. In 
1990, a new legislation established that water and sanitation was of municipal 
competency, creating a direct conflict with the former law that had not been 
repealed. On the other hand, a centralized regulatory agency was established  
in 1991 to regulate water rates (other attributes such as quality control or use 
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and protection of water sources correspond to the ministries of health and 
environment and natural resources respectively). The mismatch with the 
decentralized nature of provision is most evident in rthe direct conflict that 
arises between the rate setting mandate of the regulator and the 
municipalities’ right, established in the 1990 legislation, to establish their own 
water rates. These problems, together with the lack of independence of the 
regulator, result in bad regulatory outcomes and are at the root of what 
Savedoff and Spiller (1999) call a low-level equilibrium made of politicization 
of the service, low prices, and bad service of corruption.  
 
Keeping in mind the discussion above on the interrelations between different 
institutional layers and mismatches, the next sections review three main facets of 
governance in the water sector, namely 1) the public vs. private provider debate (as 
well as the issue of different forms of private involvement); 2) the design of an 
optimal regulation; 3) the problems of access and affordability and in particular the 
question surrounding the design of subsidies. The issue of the design of incentives 
for actors of water related institutions (providers’ managers, regulators) is addressed 
as part of sections III and IV. 
 
III.  The Public vs. Private Provision Debate 
 
One of the more controversial institutional issues in the water sector has to do with 
potential private sector involvement in its operations. Obviously, private 
participation is not a specificity of the water sector, as it has become increasingly 
common in all infrastructure sectors in the last decades, but probably because of the 
essential nature of the good (see introduction) and of its high social impact (see 
section IV below), more strongly polarized views exist here on whether the private 
 12 
sector should be allowed in any of the segments of water production and 
distribution.6 
As in other sectors, organizational structures in the water sector vary widely, often 
within the same country, ranging from highly organized public utilities, to regulated 
concessions to private providers and community water supply systems. Private 
participation itself takes many forms, from outright privatization to concessions, 
management or lease contracts. The first issue is to understand the existing mix of 
ownership and control options, which will have in particular important implications 
for the incentives faced by water institutions managers.  
In the public sphere, the corporatization of publicly owned firms make managers less 
subject to political pressures, in particular if formal rules dictate the grounds for 
removal or replacement. Private sector managers will naturally be less exposed to 
political opportunism and be more concerned with efficiency and profit 
maximization. This in principle should make them more sensitive to high-powered 
incentive regulatory schemes such as price caps (Foster, 2005). 
Table 3: Ownership and Control of Water providers 
 Ownership Control (if different) 
Public State Public corporation (if 
corporatization) 
Public / Private  State  
State and private 
Private corporation in 
most cases 
Private Private corporation  
Cooperative Users  
Source: Adapted from Foster (2005) 
 
In the intermediate category where private participation goes hand in hand with 
some degree of public ownership, it is important to note that effective control 
generally remains with the private operators. For example, Hall (1997) notes that in 
Central Europe, control of shared ownership companies was in the hand of private 
                                                           
6
 See for example Hall et al. (2005). 
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operators in three out of four of the Hungarian companies, and five out of six of the 
Czech companies, even though in some cases the private companies had only a 
minority of shares. 
Looking more closely at the nature of the intermediate category of mixed public-
private institutional forms, the following table summarizes the spectrum of private 
participation forms, mostly by transnational corporations (TNC). 
Table 4: Forms of Private Involvement 
Low           Extent of private sector participation         High 
Work and 
service 
contracts 
Management 
and 
maintenance 
contracts 
Operation and 
maintenance 
concessions 
Build operate 
transfer 
concessions 
Full 
privatization 
 Public private partnerships  
 
Most contracts with TNC participation are concessions or operation and 
management contracts. Between 1996 and 2006, the shares in terms of foreign 
investment commitments in the water sector worldwide show that 70% were 
concessions and 25% management and lease contracts (UNCTAD, 2008). 
It is interesting to note that the TNC active in water are relatively few. About 75% 
(resp. 60%) of all investment commitments in developing and transition countries 
between 1996 and 2006 correspond to the 10 (resp. 5) major players. The market is 
dominated by French companies (Suez, Veolia Environnement ) and to a lesser extent 
Spanish and English companies. 
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Table 5: Private Sector Participation in Water Projects in Selected Developing 
Countries 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2008. 
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Despite the intensity of the debate on this issue, it is notable that the share of 
customers served by private providers worldwide is still quite small. The most recent 
figures show that the water industry is relatively closed to foreign investment and 
that 90% of all water utilities (at the national or local level) are run by public entities 
(UNCTAD, 2008). Between 1985 and 2008, TNCs have provided water to over 180 
million people in developing countries, almost exclusively in urban areas (the 
exception is Chile). Table 5 from UNCTAD (2008) shows that the private sector share 
of supply exceeded 30% of the population in only 6 of the 70 developing countries 
included, while in most countries, this share was below 5%. 
The following map (Figure 2) shows the shares of customers under private provision 
in Latin America, the region which attracted the bulk of private investments in 
infrastructure sectors, in 1990 and 2003 respectively. Again, it is apparent that with 
the exception of Chile, these have remained relatively low. 
Figure 2: Shares of customers under private provision in Latin America in 1990 and 
2003 
Water
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Source: Andres, Foster, Guasch and Haven (2007). 
 
Finally, note that small scale service providers are also quite active in this sector. 
These include community organizations, village administration (some of which 
receive public funding from governments, donors or NGOs), as well as a majority of 
small scale private service providers (SPSPs) relying on private resources. A recent 
review by Kariuki and Schwartz (2005) identified around 10,000 SPSPs in 49 
countries, a number that probably represents a lower bound on the actual prevalence 
of these operators. The SPSPs are generally small units, particularly active in peri-
urban, rural or remote regions, as well as in regions with failed public institutions. 
The World Bank standard definition defines them as units of less than 50 employees, 
assets up to $3 million and sales of up to $3 million. In this range, Kariuki and 
Schwartz (2005) indicate that an efficient SPSP will have a staff-to connection ration 
of up to 4:1000, so that a unit with 20 employees could serve a community of 25,000 
people. That means clearly that SPSPs have the potential to become the reference 
local operators in small and medium developing country towns. The following Table 
6 shows the coverage of water SPSPs across selected developing country large cities. 
Table 6: Coverage by water supply SPSPs around the world 
Regions and Locations Population / Households served (%) Reference 
 
Africa 
% of 
population 
covered 
Benin, Cotonou  69 
Burkina Faso, Bobo Diaulasso  33 
Niangologo 68 
Ouagadougou  49 
Ivory Coast, Abidjan 35 
Boundiali  50 
Ghana, Kumasi  32 
Guinea, Conakry 66 
Kenya, Nairobi  60 
Mandera  90 
Ukunda  45 
Mali, Kayes 69 
Bamako  63 
Mauritania, Nouakchott  51 
Niger, Guidan Rouondji  40 
Nigeria, Onitsha  95 
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Ibi  40 
Dankida  15 
Senegal, Dakar 21 
Diourbel  90 
Sudan, Khartoum  80 
Somalia, Ali Matan  10 
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam  56 
Newala  25 
Uganda, Kampala  30 
Kasangati  25 
Latin America & Caribbean  
Argentina, Cordoba  15 to 20 
Bolivia, Santa Cruz  100 
Colombia, Barranquilla  20 to 25 
Guatemala, Guatemala 32 
Haiti, Port au Prince 70 
Honduras, Tegucigalpa  30 
Paraguay, Asuncion  30 
Peru, Lima  26 to 30 
East Asia and Pacific  
Cambodia, Ky Cham  50 
Indonesia, Jakarta  44 
Surabaya 27 
Philippines, Manila 30 
Cebu  36 
Ormoc  10 
Thailand, Sawee  10 
Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh  19 
South Asia  
Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar 5 
Nepal, Kathmadu 5 to 7 
Pakistan, Karachi  40 to 50 
India , Delhi 6 to 47 
Bangladesh, Dhaka 14 
Source: Kariuki and Schwartz (2005) 
The evidence shows that SPSPs generally fill the gap of deficient public providers, at 
a high cost for end users (Auriol and Blanc, 2008). Indeed, they provide water to the 
poorest part of the population, while public firms serve the richest part. Moreover, 
they are often unregulated and apply large markups, while public water is 
subsidized. As a result, the average price per cubic meter of water from SPSPs is 
close to ten times higher than that of public utilities.  
There are several reasons for the low private participation rate in the water sector. 
First of all is the controversial nature of the good mentioned above, which results in 
some well organized lobbying groups campaigning against it (see for example 
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Lobina and Hall, 2003). Moreover, many developing countries have legal or 
constitutional restrictions (about 1 in 5 restricts private and foreign involvement in 
water supply, and 1 in 4 in sewage). These political reasons have been particularly 
acute in large cities, where consumers and citizen groups face a lower cost of 
organizing themselves to lobby against private participation in water, fight tariff 
increase, etc. On the other hand, the low returns inherent to low density and income 
in small cities and rural areas has impeded private participation from large 
companies for economic viability reasons, and this vacuum has in many cases been 
occupied by SPSPs. This combination of facts suggests that the benefits from 
inefficient subsidized public services have often been captured by the ruling elite and 
the urban upper and middle class, leaving the poorest part of the population to be 
served by expensive, unregulated small scale providers (Auriol and Blanc, 2008).  
What about the relative performance of private operators? Do they really bring about 
improvements that justify the emphasis put on them? Some recent contributions 
include Andres et al. (2007), who look at 181 firms in 3 sectors (telecommunications, 
electricity distribution, water and sewerage) across 15 countries; Gassner et al. (2008), 
who analyze 1,200 utilities in 71 developing and transition countries ; and McKenzie 
and Mookherjee (2003), who focus on households in 4 Latin American countries. 
For infrastructure sectors in general, overall most studies find consistent 
improvements in operating performance and quality, no significant impacts on 
output and coverage, as well as a reduction in the workforce with related 
productivity improvements and price increases, although there is quite some 
variability on this last dimension. In most cases, quality indicators (distributional 
losses in water and electricity, percentage of incomplete calls in telecoms) improve 
markedly (see more details in Martimort and Straub, 2008). 
More specifically in water, Gassner et al. (2008) reach a number of interesting 
conclusions. In terms of the relative performance increase of private versus public 
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companies, over a period of 5 years, they find a 12% (resp. 18%) gain in residential 
connections (resp. residential sanitation coverage), a 18% increase in water sold per 
worker (which mirrors a 22% reduction in average employment), and a 41% increase 
in the number of hours of daily water service. However, no clear increase in 
investment is apparent, especially for management contracts and concessions, and no 
significant price changes are recorded. This fuels the suspicion that either the 
efficiency gains were simply used to get closer to some efficiency frontier (reducing 
spillages, service underpricing or state subsidies), or they were captured by private 
operators through higher profits and by governments through higher taxes (or lower 
subsidies). This implies as a corollary the idea of some collusive behavior to 
implement lax regulation of tariffs, as argued in Martimort and Straub (2008) and 
Bonnet, Dubois, Martimort and Straub (2006) to explain the skyrocketing level of 
dissatisfaction with privatization of public services in Latin America at the turn of 
the century. Note that in the water sector, the structure of rates before and after the 
reforms clearly raises specific questions. Tariff rebalancing, from a situation in which 
prices are well below costs (implying large and inefficient subsidies, see Section V 
below), implies more than in any other sector that rates have to increase. While the 
dissatisfaction figures available do unfortunately not distinguish between different 
infrastructure sectors, it is likely that this aspect would weigh heavily on popular 
evaluations of water privatization. 
In terms of welfare, Noll et al. (2002) summarize calculations of net welfare changes 
including net consumer surplus and changes in the net welfare of workers, 
government and buyers over a ten years period in the cases of Buenos Aires, 
Santiago, Lima and Conakry. They find positive welfare effects in all cases, 
suggesting potential gains from private participation are high. If one adds to this 
quite robust evidence of a reduction in health externalities (for example in Argentina, 
a reduction in infant mortality of the poorest households, as documented by Galiani 
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et al., 2005), there is little doubt about the economic suitability of private 
participation in water. 
However, as we have seen, the peculiar political economy of the sector has made this 
difficult to achieve. The politically sensitive nature of water, the high degree of 
resistance to private involvement, the (sometimes justified) perception that efficiency 
gains are not passed on back to consumers, have led to increasing difficulties in 
bringing in new investors, as well as to many cases of operators being expropriated 
(see for example cases in Argentina or Bolivia recently), and to pervasive 
renegotiations (Guasch, Laffont and Straub, 2007 and 2008). As a result, private 
operators are increasingly reluctant to investing in contexts where they perceive high 
political and regulatory risks.   
 
IV.  Regulation 
 
Two main aspects of the water sector need to be addressed at the regulatory level. 
First of all, because of the non-competitive nature of the sector and of the importance 
of sunk costs resulting from the very long life span and the specificity of assets, the 
ability of governments to commit to efficient prices over long enough periods to 
allow for full cost recovery is problematic. In particular, the high ratio of fixed to 
variable costs implies that utilities need to collect quasi-rents to recover its fixed cost 
(see Noll et al., 2002). That makes the government credibility problem a very 
stringent one, as the expropriation of quasi rents will lead to a gradual deterioration 
of the network and a lower quality of the service, as well as possibly to growing 
difficulties in attracting new investors. 
This problem is compounded by the specificity of the sector’s political economy. 
First, the sensitivity of the water issue in public opinion is likely to exacerbate 
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pressures to push prices way below their full cost recovery level. Second, the 
difficulty in observing the state of the physical network (mostly underground pipes) 
opens the possibility for operators to underinvest in maintenance, thereby extracting 
additional rents from the system. Third, the risk of regulatory capture by the 
operators themselves is also non negligible. 
Regulatory agencies should therefore be designed in such a way that they are 
reasonably free from short-term political interference from politicians and other 
organized groups (certain categories of customers, suppliers, etc.). Any of these 
groups with potentially large stakes in the regulatory process has incentives to invest 
significant resources in influencing it, leading to regulatory rules that extract too 
much rent from the firms, expropriate the quasi-rents and induce too little 
investment as a result. On the other hand, the need for credibility and independence 
should be balanced by the fact that a very independent regulator may be more easily 
captured by the utilities themselves, leading to high prices, social discontent and 
political opposition to further private participation (Laffont, 2005). Accountability, 
through open access to information, transparency of decisions processes and 
possibilities of judicial review are key aspects in that respect. 
The way the regulatory design addresses this first credibility issue depends on a 
number of features, among which the degree of operational and financial autonomy, 
appointment mechanisms, resources generation and appeal possibilities. Foster 
(2005) reviews in the case of Latin American countries, a number of these 
organizational features.  
Regulatory bodies are characterized by different types of leadership and varying 
durations of term, with consequences on the stability of the process. While in some 
countries leadership is individual, in others it is collegial. This last type of 
organization may insure against sudden shift of leadership and also make regulatory 
capture more difficult, at the cost of making the process more cumbersome. 
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Appointment and removal mechanisms also have direct consequences for the degree 
of independence of the regulator: transparent and fair criteria should protect 
regulators against political opportunism and ensure a professional and independent 
regulatory process. However, Foster (2005) shows that some gap exists between 
formal legal procedures and their enforcement. In particular, in most Latin American 
countries regulators have had shorter average duration in their position than the 
legal term of reference. Finally, resources are fundamental in ensuring regulatory 
independence. In Latin America, the principle of financial autonomy is common, and 
most agencies are financed through a percentage levy on the turnover of the industry 
(with the exception of Chile that relies on a general tax). Agencies count with staffs of 
between 20 (Bolivia) and 100 (Peru) employees and budgets of between US$ 2 million 
(Bolivia, Chile) and 7 million (Argentina, Greater Buenos Aires), this last one being 
an outlier for its high number of employees. 
How do the elements above influence the incentives faced by firms? Andres, Guasch 
and Straub (2007) develop an index of regulatory quality, based on legal solidity 
(depending on whether the regulatory framework is established by law or not), 
financial strength (independence and amount of resources), and decision-making 
autonomy (independence and duration of appointment, as well as collegiality of 
decisions). They go on to show that the better the quality of regulation, the closer the 
alignment between financial returns and costs of capital. In the sample of 34 
concessions built by Sirtaine, Pinglo, Guasch, and Foster (2005), including the water 
sector, the quality of regulation appears to be a significant determinant of the 
divergence between the overall profitability of the concession and its corresponding 
hurdle rate.  
The second specific problem of regulation in the water sector, mentioned in Section I, 
is the overlap of different dimensions of regulation. First of all, there is an overlap 
between the economic dimension (key public service, component of urban 
infrastructure), the health dimension (potable water and adequate sanitation) and the 
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environmental dimension. As a result, several ministries are typically involved in 
policy making, and several regulatory bodies endowed with potentially overlapping 
tasks. The question is whether regulators should cumulate tasks, as for example price 
setting and quality monitoring that are commonly bundled into the attributions of 
economic regulators, or whether there should be specific functional regulators. The 
United Kingdom is an example of this last approach, with several regulators in 
charge of the different aspects. The Office of Water Regulation (Ofwat) regulates 
prices and ensures the viability of providers, the Drinking Water Inspectorate deals 
with the monitoring of drinking water quality, and the Environment Agency 
overlooks the quality of water in rivers and basins. While this institutional scheme 
seems to have been designed carefully enough to avoid overlapping and therefore 
potentially conflicting regulatory making, the generation of externalities and 
conflicting investment incentives for the firms is still present, for example between 
price and environmental regulation (Laffont, 2005). 
The other relevant overlap is the geographical one. Again, firms subject to several 
local regulators, because they rely on water from locations outside the jurisdiction of 
their local regulator may be less inclined to invest. Such a situation arose in the 
United States in the nineteenth century (Laffont, 2005). In Latin America, in countries 
that have moved past the traditional model of publicly provided water with no 
regulation, most regulatory agencies are organized at the national level, except in 
some federal states. However, it is often the case that the resulting conflicts between 
local supply and national regulation result in the regulatory legal framework not 
being enforced, as in Colombia and Peru. Argentina is a case of mixed national and 
regional or local regulation in some states.  
Assessing the optimality of regulatory decentralization is a complex task. Problems 
of credibility in committing to regulatory stability in principle argue in favor of some 
decentralization and delegation at the local level. However, this is weakened by 
problems of capture and collusion that are more serious in the weak institutional 
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environments of developing countries (Laffont, 2005). Lets also mention that very 
few countries have opted for cross-sectoral agencies (Panama and Bolivia, although 
in this last case sectoral managers enjoy autonomy of decisions). 
Finally, in complying with the several tasks they are endowed with (enforce sectoral 
laws and compliance of operators with legal and contractual obligations, determine 
tariff levels, assist the resolution of conflicts), regulatory design also face a trade-off 
between ensuring independence from the many existing interests and accountability 
about decisions made. Accountability depends on the nature of the appeal and 
complaint processes, as well as on consumer involvement (Foster, 2005). 
 
V.  Affordability 
 
In a context of reform of water systems, with its corollary of prices increasing 
towards cost recovery levels, issues of affordability become crucial. Foster and Yepes 
(2006) show that in most developing countries, these concerns should not be 
downplayed. For example, in India and Africa, they report that approximately 70% 
of households could be expected to face difficulties if full cost recovery tariffs were 
applied. In Latin America’s lower income countries (Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay), cost recovery tariffs would similarly generate affordability problem for 
around half of the population.  
As a result, water subsidies, in one form or another, are very prevalent around the 
developing world, where most tariffs are well below full cost recovery levels. This is 
apparent in the large correlation that exists between per capita GDP and average 
residential tariffs, as well as the in the fact that average tariffs in low income 
countries are about one tenth of those in high income countries. Moreover, adding to 
this distorted price structure, there is differential pricing between residential and 
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industrial users in close to 90% of water utilities (Komives, Foster, Halpern and 
Wodon, 2005). 
Quantity-targeted subsidies, either in the form of either increasing block tariffs (IBT) 
or volume-differentiated tariff (VDT), are the most prevalent ones (80% of cases). 
However, Komives et al. (2005) show that they are always regressive. The “quality” 
of subsidies in term of how well they target needy populations can be assessed using 
a “benefit targeting performance indicator”, denoted by Ω, which measures the share 
of subsidies received by the poor relative to the share of poor in the overall 
population. This indicator is equal to 1 for a randomly distributed benefit, while a 
value above (resp. below) 1 indicates a progressive (resp. regressive) subsidy.  
For quantity-targeted subsidies, Komives et al. (2005) find an average of Ω=0.62. This 
type of subsidies do better if a high proportion of poor is connected, but rarely 
exceed Ω=1. The main problems appear to be the low access rate of poor households, 
the fact that the difference in quantity consumed between poor and non-poor 
households is smaller than usually assumed, and the fact that the structure of tariffs 
often includes large fixed fees, which disproportionally penalize poor households, 
sometimes even precluding access. 
Other forms of subsidies have the potential to do better. Geographical targeting 
typically leads to Ω≈1, while means testing implies an average targeting performance 
of Ω≈1.3. Finally, subsidy mechanisms based on self-selection, such as public 
standposts, are even more progressive, with an average performance of Ω≈1.8. 
However, this last situation refers in general to rather small subsidies, with a 
consequent limited impact, and the benefits must be qualified because of the welfare 
cost of the lower quality associated to the service. Finally, in low coverage areas, 
connection subsidies might be more progressive, but this will depend on the fact that 
all household take up connections at the same rate in response to subsidies. 
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Overall, the results in Komives et al. (2005) lead to the conclusion that means-tested 
subsidies are more efficient. On the other hand, they also imply a cost linked to 
significant errors of both inclusion (giving a subsidy to non-poor households) and 
exclusion (not giving it to a poor household) (Estache, Foster and Wodon, 2002). 
Another conclusion is that differences in access rates across regions or countries are 
an important driver of differences in the effectiveness of different types of subsidies. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that utility subsidies generally perform significantly 
worse than a large variety of social programs, and the difference is mostly due to the 
more systematic use of administrative household targeting in these programs. This 
raises the policy question of the suitability of subsidies versus other redistribution 
mechanisms, like conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs), which will be 
addressed in the next part of the paper. 
 
VI. Conclusion: Policy Issues and Guidelines for case studies. 
 
This section first briefly summarizes the most salient policy issues discussed above. It 
then identifies a couple of key issues that should be the focus of case studies and 
offers suggestions related to the choice of (group of) countries as well as to the 
methodology. 
 
1. Summary of Policy Recommendations 
 
A number of broad policy conclusions emerge from the review above. In all cases, a 
major common theme that cuts across the different issues appears to be the political 
dimension. Indeed, for each of the issues below, it could be argued that politics 
looms larger than specific design issues, making the mitigation of political obstacles 
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the crucial policy challenge once the reforms needed are identified. The suggestions 
for case studies below take special note of this aspect. 
Private Participation 
First of all, in terms of private participation, it is apparent that the presence of private 
operators has in many cases been instrumental in bringing about increases in 
coverage and quality improvements. However, it has clearly failed to induce either 
large flows of investments or significant price reductions. This problem seems to 
have two complementary explanations.  
- First of all, a selection effect, by which only countries, areas or groups of 
consumers with suitable return profiles are able to attract private investments. 
The complementary effect is to search on the side of SPSPs, which have filled 
the gap for the low profitability segments of the water market in some 
developing countries. Finally, public entities appear to have concentrated on 
relatively wealthy consumers, often providing hidden subsidies to this 
category. 
- Second, there is a political economy dimension, linked to the rebalancing of 
tariffs, as well as sometimes the capture and corruption problems inherent to 
private sector involvement. Because this has often impeded the transfer of 
efficiency gains to consumers, it has generated widespread opposition to 
private participation and the beginning of a move in the other direction. 
- This support the idea that attracting private investment to the water sector 
should still be on the agenda of policy makers, but that more care should be 
given to avoiding the pitfalls mentioned above. Doing so is likely to involve a 
good policy combination of increasing coverage and well designed, 
progressive subsidies, addressing in particular the issue of connection rates 
for poor households. 
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- Greater involvement of efficient SPSPs in medium size cities should also be 
sought. 
Regulation 
- Similarly, general recommendations on the design of regulation for main 
providers, public or private, should include the issues mentioned above: 
independence, stability, financial strength. It is very likely that the way to 
address mismatches, be they functional or geographical, will depend heavily 
on the local specificities, including political constraints, demographic 
characteristics, nature and cost of access to the resources, etc. 
- An almost untouched agenda includes the design of guidelines to bring SPSPs, 
catering for the poorest populations, into the realm of regulation. In contexts 
where SPSPs provide water to otherwise unserved market segments, policy 
makers and regulators should look for way to stimulate their activities as a 
mean to provide investment in infrastructure serving poorer users (Estache, 
Foster and Wodon, 2002). However, if this is to be a solution to address service 
deficit towards households unconnected to the main network, regulators 
should also worry about tighter regulatory oversight to avoid virtual 
monopoly pricing by such providers. 
Subsidies 
Finally, regarding the question of subsidies and social policies, it is unclear whether 
these need to be infrastructure-specific and whether water regulators should be 
involved in designing or administering welfare program. The evidence on the 
efficiency of direct consumption subsidies through utilities prices tends to indicate 
that it would be better to integrate them into governments’ general welfare and 
poverty alleviation policies, as was done in Chile and Colombia for example 
(Estache, Foster and Wodon, 2002). In any case, the right solution should depend on 
 29 
the balance between the cost of raising taxation on the one hand, and the potential 
distortions induced by direct subsidies on the other hand. 
 
2. Selection of Issues for Case Studies.7 
 
Based on the discussion above, two specific issues, which are both of crucial 
importance to improve water delivery in places it is failing and have been relatively 
understudied to date, appear to deserve more analysis. These are: 
- The access of the poor to piped water and/or small scale service providers; 
- The conflicts of jurisdiction among providers, sources of water resources and 
regulatory agencies: 
As for the first aspect, it would be interesting to gain more knowledge on a number 
of institutional interactions. These include first the way the supply of water to the 
poor varies, in terms of access, cost and quality, between large regulated water 
networks and small scale private water providers, and how additional institutional 
aspects, such as the geographical coverage of regulated providers (national, regional 
or local), their ownership structure (private or public), specific aspects of regulation 
and pricing (level of tariffs, subsidies to connections or by consumption levels), alter 
this picture. 
As for the second aspect, the objective is to gain more knowledge on how and why 
problems of jurisdiction among providers and water resource management and 
regulation (e.g., local providers and sources of water outside their jurisdiction; local 
providers and regional or national regulators) affect the coverage and quality of 
water provision. Additionally, related issues include the accountability of regulatory 
agencies, as well as the overlaps between multiple regulatory agencies (e.g., for 
                                                           
7 A review of existing case studies and methodology is in the Appendix. 
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pricing, health and environmental aspects), and how these aspects affect the 
coverage and quality of water provision. 
Moreover, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, political issues appear to 
weigh heavily on most institutional aspects in the water sector. Case studies should 
therefore devote special attention to the politics of water. This includes, the analysis 
of which political factors limit the possibilities or effectiveness of private sector 
participation in water supply (e.g., political ideology, clientelistic politics, corruption 
and lack of transparency, expropriation and regulatory risks due to the lack of checks 
and balances, accountability, or autonomy of regulatory agencies), and this both for 
large scale regulated operators and small scale unregulated ones. 
Another important aspect has to do with the way different political actors interfere in 
the water sector, influencing for example the operation of public providers, the 
decisions of regulatory agencies, the selection of concessionaires and allocation of 
contracts, the allocation of subsidies, the operation of large or small private 
providers, the viability of particular reform initiatives, etc. In each case, it will be 
interesting to determine the channels of this influence (for example, is there capture 
of regulatory agencies?) and the effects on access, cost and quality of water for 
different categories of the population. Political actors of interest here include in 
particular political parties and special interest groups related to public or private 
providers, construction firms, business associations, environmental and other civil 
society groups and, of course, consumers. Regarding this last category, a related 
aspect that has a non negligible impact on accountability of providers and regulators 
has to do with the nature and quality of information available to citizens about the 
delivery of water services (quality of water supplies and its consequences, costs and 
subsidies, etc.). 
  
3. Suggestions of countries and methodology for further case studies 
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Subject to the general guidelines included in the terms of reference, an obvious 
challenge is to generate more country studies on regions that have not been covered 
extensively: Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, transition 
countries. More specifically, the choice of countries could be geared towards:  
- Sets of countries with high decentralization in which there are wide 
governance/institutional differences across subnational units (e.g., in the 
degree and form of private participation or in the way public provision is 
organized). These could be large, federal countries such as Argentina (which, 
however, has already been the object of several studies), or possibly Brazil or 
India. It is likely that in these two last cases, good microeconomic household-
level data should be available to analyze the reasons and apparent effects on 
service delivery (coverage, efficiency, quality) of such differences within 
countries.  
- Pairs of similar countries (in terms of level of development and size) with 
different degrees of decentralization or with different levels of private 
participation, in order to examine, through a descriptive approach, the 
political economy or other reasons for the institutional differences and the 
impact on service delivery (coverage, quality, etc.). These should probably be 
chosen among a subset of small countries in a geographic area such as the 
Middle East, North Africa or South-East Asia for example. 
- Countries in which major institutional changes have taken place, e.g., a major 
drive for privatization or decentralization. These could be chosen among the 
set of countries already responding to some of the criteria above, to gain 
multiple focus on specific cases. In such a case, the approach is likely to 
remain a descriptive one, focusing on the evolution in time, unless a natural 
experiment across subnational units can be identified for example. 
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- For case studies focusing specifically on SPSPs (or, in broader terms, small 
scale providers including public ones), a suitable set of countries could 
include a Latin American one (e.g., Paraguay, which is a country in which 
small scale providers are active both in the capital city Asunción and in 
small/medium size rural localities), an Asian one (e.g., India) and an African 
country (e.g., Mali or Burkina Faso). A further criterion could be to compare 
the behavior of SPSPs in a country not having experienced large scale 
privatization (e.g., again Paraguay) versus one that has (e.g., Guinea). Here 
again, various methodological approaches could be followed, but a 
combination of descriptive work, as this is an area where more details on 
institutional organization would be welcome, and quantitative analysis, based 
for example on the application of small scale surveys similar to those in 
Galiani et al. (2008), could be fruitful. 
- Finally, depending on the choices made above, it may be possible to generate 
regional comparisons of water system characteristics, similar to Foster (2005), 
on a subset of Asian or African countries. This remains mostly a descriptive 
task that could probably be best achieved as a result of pooling information 
from a set of individual countries descriptive studies. It is however unlikely 
that the sample size (at most a few dozens countries) will be large enough to 
allow for econometric analysis. 
As for data collection and methodological issues, general guidelines are again 
included in the terms of reference. For water specifically, projects should aim at 
filling information gaps on specific issues including: 
- Sector outputs and outcomes, such as coverage and quality of water 
services by socio economic groups. In particular, it would be interesting to 
document differences of access of the poor (urban and rural) to regulated 
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water network systems versus small scale private providers, as well as 
differences in cost and quality among these different providers. 
- Issues of client use and satisfaction through household and client surveys, 
expenditure track surveys, etc 
Finally, as documented in the Appendix below and in the terms of reference, there is 
a large array of methodologies, both quantitative and qualitative, that can and have 
been used to perform case studies on water sectors. The projects should select the 
relevant methodologies, according to the specificities of the country or countries 
under study, the (planned) availability of data and the strength of the researchers 
involved. Obviously, greater added value would obtain from using microeconomic 
data (either household- or firm-level). The sample size and characteristic would have 
to be determined according to the ease of collecting such data and the nature of 
hypotheses to be tested. If necessary, teaming up different competences, for example 
by adding an outside microeconometrician to the local team, could be envisioned. 
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Appendix: Review of existing contributions and methodology 
 
A number of country or city case studies already exist. Most of them have focused on 
Latin America and, to a lesser extent, Africa. 
- Savedoff and Spiller (1999) include chapters on Honduras, Peru, Mexico, Chile 
and Argentina.8  
- Noll et al. (2002) include chapters on Santiago (Chile), Buenos Aires 
(Argentina), Mexico City (Mexico), Lima (Peru), Abidjan (Cote d’Ivoire) and 
Conakry (Guinea).9 
- McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) review welfare and poverty implications of 
utilities privatizations, including water, in four countries: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Mexico and Nicaragua.10 
- Chong (2008) presents case studies of privatization in the water sectors of 
Colombia, Ecuador (Quito and Guayaquil), as well as one on the expansion of 
water services to shantytowns in Argentina.11 
- Seroa da Motta, Thomas, Saade Hazin, Feres, Nauges and Saade Hazin (2004) 
analyze more general water management systems in France, Mexico and 
Brazil. 
                                                           
8 Chapters authored by Walker, Velásquez, Ordóñez and Rodríguez (Honduras), Tamayo, Barrantes, 
Conterno and Bustamante (Peru), Ozuna and Gómez (Mexico), Morandé and Doña (Chile) and 
Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo (Argentina). 
9
 Chapters authored by Shirley, Xu and Zuluaga (Santiago), Alcázar, Abdala and Shirley (Buenos 
Aires), Haggarty, Brook and Zuluaga (Mexico), Alcázar, Xu and Zuluaga (Lima), Ménard and Clarke 
(Abidjan and Conakry). 
10
 Chapters authored by Ennis and Pinto (Argentina), Barja, McKenzie and Urquiola (Bolivia),  López-
Calva and Rosellón (Mexico), and Freije and Rivas (Nicaragua). 
11
 Chapters authored by Galiani, González-Rozada and Schargrodsky (Argentina), Barrera-Osorio and 
Olivera (Colombia) and Chong, Galdo and Torero (Peru). 
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- On the other hand, Foster (2005) is an example of a cross-regional comparison 
of water supply systems, based on 17 Latin American countries, focusing 
particularly on the modalities of private participation and of regulation. 
The review of these contributions reveals the different methodological approaches 
available to develop case studies. First, a number of studies adopt a purely 
descriptive approach of the water system, focusing on the state of its different 
institutional components and on specific outcomes of interest. The explanatory 
power of these papers is based either on the analysis of the evolution of a water 
system over time, sometimes including the coverage of a major reform, so that 
variations in outcomes, possibly before and after the reform, can be observed (e.g.  
Mexico City or Abidjan, in Noll et al., 2002, or Chile, in Savedoff and Spiller, 1999), or 
on the comparison of the institutional framework and outcomes of different 
subnational units at one point in time (e.g. Quito vs. Guayaquil in Chong, 2008, Peru 
or the study of the Buenos Aires vs. the Corrientes concession, in Savedoff and 
Spiller, 1999). Additionally, some studies (the cases of Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago 
and Chile, in Noll et al., 2002) perform welfare calculations to assess the impact of 
reform, based on a partial equilibrium, cost-benefit methodology à la Jones, Tandon 
and Vogelsang (1990). The advantage of the descriptive approach is the richness it 
allows in terms of the details concerning historical background, institutional details, 
or political economy constraints for example. Additionally, this is an aspect that 
usually plays on local researchers’ strength, as they tend to have in depth knowledge 
of relevant institutional details and evolutions and good access to corresponding 
data and anecdotal evidence. Its main weakness is linked to the fact that the focus on 
a single national context (or on subunits within that context) does generally not allow 
researchers to control for all the relevant parameters of the environment that may 
affect the outcomes of interest. Equally worrying is the fact that it is not possible in 
such cases to address the non-randomness of reforms along dimensions such as 
timing, placement and intensity. 
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Second, some studies have attempted to make more systematic use of data of 
different kind.  
- The most prevalent methodology is the reliance on household survey data to 
analyze a number of outcomes such as coverage, quality, demand, fraction of 
household budget allocated to the service, poverty and welfare. Examples are 
found in the study of Colombia, included in Chong (2008), which implements 
a difference-in-differences approach, and best practice is found in McKenzie 
and Mookherjee (2003), for four Latin American countries. The advantage of 
such studies is that high quality microeconomic data provide a very accurate 
picture of the effect of different institutional options in water delivery across 
different population groups, as well as a way to assess precisely the impact of 
subsidy schemes. The disadvantages lie in the stringent data requirements, 
which may often not be fulfilled, and the technically complex nature of the 
econometric techniques to be used. 
- Firm level data, generally across local geographical units, such as the Mexico 
City case study in Savedoff and Spiller (1999), which relies on a cost function 
econometric approach across 46 firms. Pros and cons are broadly similar to 
those mentioned in the previous point. 
- Own designed surveys, on selected samples, meant to capture comparisons 
between specific institutional settings or the effect of reforms affecting well-
defined groups. An example is found in the study of water expansion in 
Argentinean Shantytowns, in Chong (2008), where the authors apply a 
difference-in-differences approach to analyze the effect of new water 
connections on household level outcomes (diarrhea, water-related expenses) 
in specific neighborhoods. The technical difficulties of such studies are rather 
concentrated at the design stage (either using non-random data and 
addressing the resulting problems econometrically, identifying a natural 
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experiment, or designing the framework for a randomized trial), but they can 
benefit from the specific knowledge of local researchers, ideally combined 
with the input of someone familiar with the technical aspects involved. 
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